独立董事独立性、关联激励与行为均衡

Independence, Association Incentive and Behavior Equilibrium

本文通过对委托 -代理激励理论和关联博弈激励思想的运用和拓展 ,主要考察了在独立性、激励和风险分担三重约束下 ,独立董事激励合约的基本参数特征以及诱使独立董事高水平合作的关联激励机制。

This paper, based on the application and expansion of principal-agent incentive theory and the thought of association game incentive, mainly discusses the basic parametric characteristics of independent director incentive contract and the mechanism of association incentive leading to independent directors' high-level cooperation under the threefold constraints of independence and incentive and risk sharing. The paper concludes that under the informational asymmetry and the trade-off between independence and incentive, both the intensity and the optimum effort level of independent director incentive are less and lower than those under the conditions with no restraint of true independence. And during the association game of independent directors' acting game and social game, the association incentive ensures that the level of independent directors' effort is higher than that during the single acting game. Thus, both the firm and the independent director can benefit from it.