会计信息质量与监管博弈

An analysis of game theory about accounting information quality and supervise

运用博弈论的方法 ,从经济学的角度对上市公司会计信息披露质量与监管方的行为进行分析 ,指出我国会计信息披露过程中博弈方的行为战略选择、存在的问题 ,并得到启示 :降低监管者的检查成本、加强对监管者的奖惩、提高监管部门的依法监管水平、提高违规成本 ,倡导诚信经营。

The thesis uses game theory, gives an analysis about listed company accounting information quality and supervise through economy. It points out that during accounting information disclose, the strategy choices of the player and the problems. After that, there are some inspires: decrease supervise ′s cost, improve inspire and punish cost, increase false cost and advocate “honesty and credit” and improve supervise ′s level.