对银行业风险监管的博弈分析

Game Analysis of Banking Supervision

银行业是一种高负债经营的行业,银行经营者在"高风险高收益"的诱惑下,有从事高风险业务的内在冲动,而监管部门为了保证国民经济的健康运行,就要对银行风险进行监管,尽量最小化银行风险。因此,监管部门如何做到银行经营风险最小,银行经营者如何使得收益最大就构成了他们之间的博弈关系。他们之间,通过监管人员进行信息的交换,因此如何充分发挥监管人员的作用是监管的关键。通过建立博弈模型给解决这一问题指明了方向。

Banking has a high gearing lever and its operators are keen to the risk projects with the lure of high income. The supervision sector should regulate the banks and force them to reduce risks to ensue the healthy circulation of county's economy. The supervisor should report the disclosed risks to the supervision sector so that they can alert the risks in advance and control them ,but the sector must take action to prevent the collusion between the operators and supervisors.