R&D成果转让合同履约的定量分析:激励对策与优效设计

The Quantitative Analysis of Performing Obligations in a Transference Contract of R&D Achievements:Designment of Incentive Strategies and Optimal Efficiency

R＆D(研究与开发)成果向生产力转化难的问题因研发方利益无保障而普遍存在。本文运用经济对策理论和数量分析方法,对R＆D成果转让合同给出定量描述,并在此基础上对实际中常见的三种成果转让情形分别给出了激励受让方履约的合同设计。对三种合同的履约激励相容性给出了证明。对其中两种情形还讨论了使受让方履约与研发方利润最大化或审计成本最小化的双目标优效合同设计,建立了各情形下的双目标激励优效条件。最后通过一个具体例子说明所设计的多期双目标优效合同的可行性及应用。

A critical problem for transferring R&D(Research and Development)achievements from the party of R&D to the party of obtainment is how to ensure the interest of the former.This paper considers the designment of transference contracts based on game theory and quantitative analysis.We provide three types of contracts which are expressed normally in the quantitative way and are incentive compatible for the target that the party of obtainment performs its obligations willingly.The incentive compatibility of each type of the contracts is demonstrated respectively.The designed contracts are corresponding to three common situations in practice.For two of these situations, we also discuss the designment of the contracts with optimal efficiency for a double target,which is stimulating the party of obtainment to perform its obligations and maximizing the revenue of the party of R&D.The conditions of incentive compatibility with optimal efficiency in each situation are obtained.