摘要
乞讨行为从来都不是一种被社会道德或国家法律所倡导的行为。“行乞权”既不是公民的生存权,也不是一项“穷人的道德权利”或具有普遍意义的道德权利。在“行乞权”之争中,暴露出长期以来法理上,以及近些年来人们在人权理念上的种种误区。逻辑上和实践中,从法无明文禁止之处不能必然地推导出权利。人权不是一种排除义务的绝对权利,或可以凌驾于一切社会规范之上不含界限的一种特权。
Begging has never been advocated by social ethics or law. 'The right to beg' is neither the citizens' right to survive, nor a moral right of the poor, or a moral right of general meaning. The dispute over 'the right to beg' reveals people's misunderstanding about the concept of human rights in recent years. Logically and practically, that a certain behavior is not clearly stipulated by law to be forbidden doesn't suggest the right to do it. Human right is not an absolute right excluding obligations, or an unrestricted privilege that goes beyond all social norms.
出处
《北京行政学院学报》
CSSCI
2004年第3期57-63,共7页
Journal of Beijing administration institute
关键词
“行乞权”
权利推定
人权
法定权利
法律权利
生存权
the right to beg
misunderstanding of legal principle
the assumption of rights
human rights