关于中国人民银行独立性的研究——来自独立性指数和政策反应函数的证据被引量：13

A Study On the Independence of People's Bank of China: Evidence from Independence indices and Policy Reaction Function

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摘要本文的目的在于 :(1 )根据GMT和CWN的方法 ,将中国人民银行有关法律指数化 ,并通过独立性指数的纵向和跨国家比较来分析中国人民银行在法律层面上的独立性变化和独立性程度 ;(2 )构建中国人民银行政策反应函数 (policyreactionfunction) ,并通过政策工具变量 (instrumentvariables)和政治事件虚拟变量 (dummyvariables)的变化来反映中国人民银行的实际独立性。 After the collapse of the Bretton Woods System, avoiding inflation and fluctuation of economic growth has become one of fields in macroeconomic and institutional research in many developed countries and developing countries. Both theory research and empirical study demonstrate that the independence of the central bank and the macroeconomic stability are closely intertwined. So, since 1970s institutional reforms on the independence of the central bank have been widely carried out in many countries. Also a series of institutional reforms have been implemented in People's Bank of China (PBC) from1980s to 1990s. However, until now there has not been any systematic research inquiring into the independence of People's Bank of China yet. The purpose of this article is: Firstly, according to the GMT's approach and the CWN's approach to measure the legal indices of PBC independence, then use the vertical and transnational comparisons of independence indices to analyze the changes and the level of the independence of PBC. Secondly, to construct the policy reaction function of PBC, and use it to analyze the real independence of PBC according to the changes of policy instrument variables and political dummy variables in the policy reaction function.

作者伏润民

机构地区云南大学发展研究院金融经济研究所

出处《经济研究》 CSSCI 北大核心 2004年第6期15-23,共9页 Economic Research Journal

基金教育部留学回国人员科研启动基金的资助

关键词中国人民银行独立性指数政策反应函数通货膨胀率货币政策货币供给量 Independence of central bank Independence index Policy reaction function

分类号 F832.31 [经济管理—金融学] F822.0 [经济管理—财政学]

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