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国际竞争条件下并购政策效应的模型分析

Analyzing the Merging Policy under International Competition
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摘要 通过模型对国际竞争条件下并购的效应进行考查。该模型展示了并购所引起的出口竞争对手之间的国际溢出效应。这种正的溢出效应如此之强,以至于并购会给没有参与并购的企业带来巨大收益,从而使得力求福利最大化同时强烈反对国内并购的政府默认跨国并购。国际竞争的存在对一个国家企图采用以邻为壑政策构成有力限制,因为此时搭便车效应的存在会使国内并购的好处耗费殆尽。 The authors consider the merging policy under international competition with a model. The model highlights international spillovers between rival exporters that result from mergers.Such positive spillovers can be strong enough for a merger to bestow greater benefits upon non-merging countries and for welfare-maximizing governments to turn a blind eye to international mergers.A related point is that the presence of foreign competition is a disciplining device on a country's temptation to pursue a beggar thy neighbor merger policy: the free rider effect of a national merger makes a merger unattractive relative to the case where there is no foreign competition..
作者 关涛 胡浩
出处 《太原理工大学学报(社会科学版)》 2004年第2期44-47,共4页 Journal of Taiyuan University of Technology(Social Science Edition)
关键词 并购政策 国际竞争 溢出效应 模型 merger policy international competition spillovers model
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参考文献5

  • 1[1]关涛,胡浩.开放条件下并购政策的福利分析[Z].2004.
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  • 3[3]Stigler, George. Monopoly and Oligopoly by Merger [Z]. American Economic Review 40,1950.23-34.
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