摘要
研究了多零售商竞争环境下的供应链协作机制问题 ,分析了批发价契约和收入共享契约不能有效协作供应链的原因 .证明了本文提出的线性转移支付契约由于其在划分供应链收益时所具有的灵活性 ,保证了在系统性能达到最优时供应商和零售商的参与约束都能得到满足 ,因此能够有效地协作供应链 。
The reason why the whole price contract and revenue sharing contract could not c oordinate supply chain was analyzed. It was proved that the linear transfer paym ent contract proposed in this paper had the flexibility of allocating the supply chain profit and therefore the participation constraint and individual rationality constraint of both retailer and supplier could be satisfi ed, as a result the linear transfer payment could coordinate the supply chain ef fectively. A numerical example is presented to confirm the above conclusion.
出处
《东南大学学报(自然科学版)》
EI
CAS
CSCD
北大核心
2004年第4期529-534,共6页
Journal of Southeast University:Natural Science Edition
关键词
供应链
协作机制
博弈论
契约
supply chain
coordination mechanism
game theory
contract