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无限期重复博弈下解读中国“第一村”——集体主义理念与低成本扩张困境

China No.1 Village in the Infinite Repeated Games--The dilemma of collectivism concept and low-cost enlargement
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摘要 密集的道德和纪律控制、集体主义信念的强化培育以及低收入加社会福利分配制度的贯彻执行,为中国“第一村”开辟了一条以低成本发展模式通向小康的道路。但随着村落经济规模的扩张,低成本发展的道路就面临双重的困境要么提高货币工资,要么大幅度增加福利。前者直接削弱了低成本发展的竞争力,后者则严重影响到村落经济发展的规模和速度。 The focused moral and discipline control, the intensified culture of collectivism concept, together with the execution and implementation of such a distribution system as low income plus high social allowance, all of these have started a low-cost developing path to the well-off society. However, with the enlargement of village economy scale, there emerges the dilemma of the low-cost developing path: raise the monetary salary, or increase the allowance. While the former will directly undermine the competitiveness of the low-cost developing path, the latter will have great impact on the scale and speed of the developing village.
作者 胡晓鹏
出处 《当代财经》 CSSCI 北大核心 2004年第6期5-9,共5页 Contemporary Finance and Economics
关键词 博弈 “第一村” 集体主义 低成本扩张 game No. 1 village collectivism low-cost enlargement, dilemma
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