期刊文献+

行业差异对团队协作水平的影响分析 被引量:1

Analysis of the Effect of Industrial Difference on the Level of Cooperation
下载PDF
导出
摘要 分别构造了存在产业差异下的团队协作静态博弈和重复博弈模型,对产业差异对团队成员的最优协作水平的影响,以及当产业差异发生变化时,其它因素对团队成员最优协作水平影响的变化情况进行分析,并得出了一系列有关团队协作的深刻结论。这些结论对于解释当前中国企业的一些经济行为,指导我国国有企业进一步深化改革具有重要意义。 The models of static game and repeated game in which industrial difference is considered are built. The degree of the industrial difference's effects on the level of optimal cooperation and the change of other factor's effect on the level of the optimal cooperation with the change of the industrial difference are analyzed. Some profound results on cooperation are obtained. These results are momentous current significance to explaining some recent economic behavior of Chinese enterprise and leading them to further deepen reform.
作者 田盈 蒲勇健
出处 《重庆大学学报(自然科学版)》 EI CAS CSCD 北大核心 2004年第6期144-147,共4页 Journal of Chongqing University
基金 教育部高校博士点基金资助项目(20020611009) 教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金资助项目(02JA790062)
关键词 产业差异 团队 协作 博弈 industrial difference teams cooperation game
  • 相关文献

参考文献7

  • 1[1]AKERLOF,GEORGE P.Incentive Contracts and Performance Measurement[J].Journal of Political Economy,1992,100: 598-614.
  • 2[2]ITOH,HIDESHI.Incentives to help in multi-agent situations[J].Econometrica,1991,59:611-636.
  • 3[3]DRAGO,ROBERT.Competition and cooperation in the workplace[J].Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization,1991,15:347-364.
  • 4[4]HOLMSTROM,BENGT.Moral hazard in teams[J].Bell Journal of Economics,1982,13:324-340.
  • 5[5]BAKER,GEORGE P.Compensation and incentives: practice Vs theory[J].The Journal of Finance,1998,43:593-616.
  • 6[6]LAZEAR,EDWARD P.Pay equality and industrial politics[J].Journal of Political Economy,1989,87:1 261-1 284.
  • 7[7]DRAGO R,GARVEY G.Incentives for helping on the Job: theory and evidence[J].Journal of Labor Economics,1998,16:1-25.

同被引文献4

引证文献1

二级引证文献2

相关作者

内容加载中请稍等...

相关机构

内容加载中请稍等...

相关主题

内容加载中请稍等...

浏览历史

内容加载中请稍等...
;
使用帮助 返回顶部