不对称信息条件下企业生产成本契约的设计

The enterprise manufacture cost contract under the conditions of asymmetric information

针对传统信息对称条件下生产成本控制指标的非有效性,运用委托代理理论的基本思想,在不对称信息条件下充分考虑了生产成本差异及会计政策选择对成本控制产生的影响,并在风险分担原则基础上设计了企业生产成本契约.结果表明,生产成本契约在满足生产工人报酬时,可以实现企业生产成本最小化,从而可以有效地解决生产成本控制问题.

To overcome the inefficiency of the manufacture cost control indexes under the conditions of traditional symmetric information, the enterprise manufacture cost contract is designed by the agency theory on the basis of the risk assignment principle taking into consideration the effects of the manufacture cost's difference and the choice of accounting policies on cost control under the conditions of asymmetric information. The manufacture cost contract not only satisfies the workers' rewards but also minimizes the manufacture cost, so the problem of manufacture cost control is well solved.