摘要
在事实上资本管制不完全或资本账户开放的国家(地区),政府维持一个钉住汇率的方法是干预外汇市场以轧平对外币的超额供求,因而一个钉住汇率的维持与否是政府与市场参与者共同作用的结果,但在分析上可单方面地从政府的收益-成本权衡中得出结论。政府维持一个钉住汇率的收益是促进贸易与投资等微观利益;成本是二元的,一是当经济的基本面发生变化、需启用汇率工具时发生的宏观经济成本,二是当市场参与者投机冲击本币时政府失去的外汇储备。当收益大于成本时,钉住汇率可维持,反之则反是。但资产市场上的收益-成本分析源于商品市场即基本面状况,它才是决定钉住汇率存亡绝续的“锚”。
In countries (areas) without absolute capital control governments intervene foreign markets to absorb the overdemand or oversupply of foreign exchange to maintain a exchange-rate peg, so whether a peg is sustainable or not depends on the interaction between government and market participants, but the result can be seen from the government’s gain-and-loss analysis. The gain for a peg is promoting international trade and investment, etc. and the loss is a two variant function, one is macroeconomic cost when the exchange-rate has to be changed to adjust the economy, the other is losing foreign reserves for the government facing speculation attack. When the gain surpasses the loss, the peg is sustainable. But the gain-and-loss analysis in asset market roots from the goods market, that is, the basic, which is the anchor for a peg.
出处
《国际金融研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2004年第6期23-27,共5页
Studies of International Finance