摘要
在生产决策过程需要重复无限期情况下,供应商和制造商之间相互影响的同时对策分析。在无限期模型中,决定生产能力的关键因素是缺货损失在供应商和制造商之间分担的份额,存在一个特定份额分配,使得利益独立条件下的生产能力与系统最优解相等。如果实际的分担份额与这个特定的份额不相等,相互独立的利益会导致供应链的低效率。
This paper focuses on the model of the supplier and the manufacture's inter-affecting simultaneous-move game under the situation that production decisions are in infinite periods. In infinite period model, the key element that determines the general production capacity is the share of lose of the stock shortage between the supplier and the manufacturer. There is a special share that makes the production capacity under the situation of independent interest equal to the systematical optimum. If the actual share is not equal to the special share, the independent interest makes the supply chain ineffective.
出处
《黑龙江工程学院学报》
CAS
2004年第2期59-62,共4页
Journal of Heilongjiang Institute of Technology
关键词
供应链
协调
对策
supply chain
game
coordination