论独立董事独立性悖论的解决及对薪酬设计的启示

The settlement of ID’s independence paradox and its instruction to the recompense design

本文从我国引入独立董事制度实践中的一个悖论开始 ,探析了其产生的理论根源。指出在我国声誉机制短时间内无法建立的情况下 ,承认独立董事的不完全独立性是薪酬设计的起点。必须采取长短期相结合的薪酬激励模式 ,独立董事薪酬设计的关键在于度的把握及操作的透明性。

This paper begins from a paradox on ID’s independence and recompense. It makes research into its academic root. It points out that admitting the incomplete independence of ID’s independence is the starting point of the recompense design in the case of failure to establish the credit mechanism within a short period. We must adopt recompense-stimulating mode combining long term with short term. The key of recompense design is to grasp the balance of economic interest and independence. In practice we also should keep the clarity of operation.