基于M型组织结构的企业内部激励机制与兼并效应

Merger Effects and the Managerial Incentive Schemes of Firms with Multidivisional Form of Internal Organization

在寡头竞争环境下,引入企业内部激励机制激励参数变量,建立了一个替代性产品M型制下企业兼并二阶段Cournot竞争博弈模型:第一阶段,兼并企业采用M型制并选择基于利润和销售收入内部激励机制的激励参数;在第二阶段,兼并后各企业的决策者根据企业提供的内部激励机制进行产量竞争。在此基础上,分析了兼并对各企业利润、产量与价格带来的影响。证明对于替代性产品行业,存在一个兼并临界规模(1)只有当兼并规模小于临界规模时,兼并企业才适合采用M型组织结构;且企业普遍存在兼并动机,产品替代化程度越高,兼并动力越大;(2)当兼并企业采用M型组织结构且兼并规模小于临界规模时,兼并对外部企业产生负外部性,但对消费者带来有利影响。本文还进一步讨论了兼并企业采用M型组织结构时内部激励机制激励参数的选择问题,证明激励参数受行业利润率、兼并规模与产品替代性程度的影响。

In this paper,we analyze merger incentives and merger effects caused by the managerial incentives based on divisional profits and revenues,and establishes a two stage game model of endogenous mergers under Cournot compettion in an oligopoly industry with substitute products.In the first stage,the owners of the firms select the managers' incentive schemes,and in the second stage,the divisional managers choose quantities or prices.It is showed that existing a critical size,and when mergers with M-form under the critical size:(1)mergers are profitable to the players,(2)mergers are not profitable to other firms out of mergers alliance,but have a converse effect on the customers.We also studies how owner of mergers firm select the optimal managers' incentive,it is showed that the parameter of the optimal incentive be determined by profit ratio,product substitution coefficient and size of mergers.