摘要
国有企业所固有的产权中所有者缺位造成了国有企业治理结构出现了缺陷 ,这些缺陷表现为国有企业董事性质的管理经营人员作为国有资产的委托人和代理人的双重身份所行使双重职能之间的矛盾。作为政府的代理人 ,其决策政治化而非市场理性化 ,由此导致甄别其行为的道德风险信息严重缺乏 ;这种道德风险就是国有企业的委托人行使不属于自己的财产使其行为缺乏成本约束。这样的企业在完全竞争市场上不能将外部性内在化 ,配置资源效率低下。由于国有企业本身所具有的超经济力量的存在 ,国有企业应该在生产并提供公共物品的行业和国家垄断行业中根据社会成本而非交易成本配置资源 。
The absence of owners in fixed property rights of state enterprises has caused the defects in management structure of state enterprises.The defects show that managers and steward of state properties,who have dual status as both truster and agent to implement dual function,may bring contradiction.As the agents of governments,they make decision politically instead of market rationality,which leads to lack of moral-risk information for distinguishing their action;the trusters of state enterprises don't take such moral rish because they implement power for the properties which don't belong to the trusters who are not restricted by lack of cost.In the competitive market,such enterprises can't make externality internality and have low effects in resources' distribution.For state enterprises have special economic power,they should develop their advantages in the industries which produce and provide public products and make resource's distribution according to social cost instead of trading cost in monopoly industries.
出处
《山西高等学校社会科学学报》
2004年第7期19-21,共3页
Social Sciences Journal of Universities in Shanxi
关键词
国有企业
产权结构
市场范围
资源配置效率
公共产品
效用函数
state enterprises
structure of property rights
market field
efficiency of resource distribution
public products
effective function