“代理人”还是“管家”?——基于国别文化差异的中国国有企业经营者的角色定位

A Self-serving Agent or a Steward: A Cross-cultural Analysis of the Role of Executives in State-owned Enterprises

在对国别文化特征比较分析的基础上 ,运用行为科学和社会学的基本工具 ,对国有企业经营者与所有者的关系进行了研究 ,以期为我国国有企业经营者的激励机制的实践设计提供研究的理论立足点 .主要结论是 :对于企业所有者而言 ,经营者的角色并不纯粹地表现为“自利的代理人” ,它是应情境而定位的 ,是所有者和经营者对于双方关系认知的博弈过程 ,其结果对双方的行为产生重大影响 ;与以美国为代表的西方国家的企业经营者更多地表现为“代理人”不同 ,在中国特定的文化特征和制度演变背景下的今天 ,国有企业的经营者更可能表现为“管家”

The relationship between shareholders and executives in state-owned enterprises is studied on the basis of cross-cultural analysis, combined the theories from psychology as well as sociology. The major conclusions are: (1) The relationship between stockolders and managers is not a pure agency relationship. What the role of executives is depends on what perception one expect other party will has, and this gaming will have an effect on what they're going to do next. (2) Compared with the most likely role of “agent” for CEOs in U. S. , the role of executives is most likely a steward rather than a self-serving agent in Chinese state-owned enterprises, under the circumstance of Chinese culture and social system. The study will give a contribution to designing a successful incentive mechanism for executives in Chinese state-owned enterprises.