基于三方博弈的大气污染治理模型及策略分析

Air Pollution Control Model and Strategy Analysis Based on Three-Party Game

针对大气污染治理过程中存在各方推诿懈怠等问题,本文基于演化博弈理论,建立了中央政府、地方政府以及废气排放企业的三方博弈模型,分析了实际情形下的演化稳定策略并提出一种理想的演化状态。这种稳定状态主要受政策成本、政治惩罚以及企业选择减排后的收入等因素影响。最后,通过数值仿真的方法分析了如何在大气污染治理中使各方都处于理想状态,并从不同角度提出了能够促进大气污染治理的建议。

In order to solve the problem of shirking by all parties in the process of air pollution control, based on the evolutionary game theory, this paper established a three-party game model of the central government, local government and exhaust emission enterprises, analyzed the evolutionary stability strategy under the actual situation and proposed an ideal evolutionary state. This stable state is mainly influenced by policy costs, political penalties, and the income of enterprises after they choose to reduce emissions. Finally, through the method of numerical simulation, the paper analyzes how to make all parties in the air pollution control in the ideal state, and puts forward some suggestions to promote air pollution control from different angles.