控股股权质押与审计收费机制分析

Analysis of Controlling Shareholder’s Right Pledge and Audit Fee System

因其方便快捷、不稀释控制权的特点,股权质押已经成为我国上市公司控股股东融资的一种重要方式。然而,股权质押也会加剧控股股东的利益侵占,降低信息披露质量,进而影响审计收费。利用2014~2019年沪深A股上市公司的数据为样本,采用固定效应面板回归,研究股权质押与审计收费的关系,进一步通过逐步回归和bootstrap的方法探讨利益侵占和信息披露质量对于两者关系的中介效应。通过实证检验,得出以下结论:1) 控股股东质押股份的上市公司,其审计费用相比对照组更高;2) 审计费用会随着控股股东质押股权百分比的提高而增长;3) 股权质押可以通过加剧控股股东利益侵占来增加审计收费;4) 控股股东股质押可以通过降低上市公司信息披露质量来提高审计收费。

Because of its convenience and non-dilution of control, equity pledge has become an important way of financing for the controlling shareholders of Listed Companies in China. However, equity pledge will also aggravate the interest occupation of controlling shareholders, reduce the quality of information disclosure, and then affect audit fees. Using the data of A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2014 to 2019 as samples, this paper uses fixed effect panel regression to study the relationship between equity pledge and audit fees, and further discusses the intermediary effect of interest encroachment and information disclosure quality on the relationship between them through stepwise regression and bootstrap. Through the empirical test, the following conclusions are drawn: 1) The audit fees of listed companies whose controlling shareholders pledge their shares are higher than those of the control group;2) The audit fee will increase with the increase of the percentage of pledged equity of the controlling shareholder;3) Equity pledge can increase audit fees by aggravating the expropriation of controlling shareholders’ interests;4) The pledge of controlling shareholders’ shares can improve audit fees by reducing the quality of information disclosure of listed companies.