大股东增持对企业真实盈余管理行为的影响研究

Research on the Influence of Major Shareholders’ Increasing Holdings on the Real Earnings Management Behavior of Enterprises

本文以2016~2020年沪深A股上市公司作为研究对象,实证检验大股东增持行为与真实盈余管理之间的关系,并在此基础上分别研究了股权集中度和分析师关注对大股东增持与真实盈余管理之间关系的影响情况。研究结果表明,上市公司大股东增持比例越高时,上市公司所操纵的真实盈余管理程度更高;且股权集中度对大股东增持比例与真实盈余管理之间的关系会起到进一步强化作用,而分析师关注度对二者关系起到抑制作用。本文通过对大股东增持与企业真实盈余管理之间的分析,以求揭示上市公司大股东是否确实存在通过真实盈余管理行为来优化其增持成本,并侵占中小股东利益。

Taking Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2016 to 2020 as the research object, this paper empirically tests the relationship between major shareholders’ overholding behavior and real earnings management, and on this basis, studies the influence of ownership concentration and analyst attention on the relationship between major shareholders’ overholding and real earn-ings management. The results show that the higher the proportion of major shareholders’ increas-ing holdings, the higher the degree of real earnings management manipulated by listed companies. And ownership concentration will further strengthen the relationship between the proportion of major shareholders’ increasing holdings and real earnings management, while analyst attention will inhibit the relationship between the two. This paper analyzes the relationship between the in-crease of major shareholders and the real earnings management of enterprises, in order to reveal whether the major shareholders of listed companies do optimize the cost of increasing their hold-ings through the real earnings management behavior, and occupy the interests of small and medi-um shareholders.