不同碳配额分配机制下供应链的减排决策及契约协调

Emission Reduction Decision and Contract Coordination of Supply Chain under Different Carbon Quota Allocation Mechanisms

为应对气候变化,我国大力推动双碳政策的实施,加快实现低碳发展的步伐。在双碳政策背景下,供应链作为温室气体排放主体低碳发展是必然之趋。本文研究碳配额分配机制对契约供应链的影响。在完全免费分配、完全拍卖分配和混合碳配额分配机制下,为存在无契约、减排成本分担契约和绿色成本分担契约的供应链分别构建Stackelberg博弈模型,求解对应的最优均衡解。研究发现,相比完全免费分配和完全拍卖分配机制,混合碳配额分配机制既可以发挥免费分配机制的作用,促进减排水平提高,又可以发挥拍卖的市场价格功能,平衡碳交易的稳定性。同时,供应链内的契约有利于制造商提高减排水平,零售商在有利可图的条件下,零售商分担的减排成本越多,制造商的减排水平越高。

In order to cope with climate change, China vigorously promotes the implementation of dual-carbon policy and accelerates the pace of realizing low-carbon development. Under the background of dual-carbon policy, the low-carbon development of supply chain as the main body of greenhouse gas emissions is an inevitable trend. This paper studies the impact of carbon allowance allocation mechanism on contractual supply chain. Under completely free allocation, complete auction allocation and mixed carbon allowance allocation mechanism, Stackelberg game models are constructed for the supply chain with no contract, emission reduction cost sharing contract and green cost sharing contract, and the corresponding optimal equilibrium solutions are solved. It is found that compared with the full free allocation and full auction allocation mechanisms, the mixed carbon allowance allocation mechanism can not only play the role of the free allocation mechanism to promote the level of emission reduction, but also play the market price function of the auction to balance the stability of carbon trading. At the same time, the contract within the supply chain is favorable to the manufacturer to improve the level of emission reduction, and the more the retailer shares the cost of emission reduction, the higher the level of emission reduction of the manufacturer under the condition of profitability.