马克思主义人学视域下的萨特自由观批判

Criticism of Sartre’s View of Freedom under the Perspective of Marxist Humanism

自由观是萨特人论逻辑的核心内容。在萨特看来,自由是人能够超越自身的必要条件。换言之,人只有先是自由的,才能在超越中不断实现自己的本质。但是,萨特所理解的自由是绝对的自由。绝对的自由正是萨特人论逻辑的内在困境所在,一方面,自由虽然与人的现实性相联系,但其本质上是一种先验层面上的意志自由。另一方面,个人自由与他人自由存在冲突,这一冲突意味着个人自由的实现总是对他人自由的实现产生影响,甚至是要以牺牲他人的自由为代价。也就是说,人存在的现实性与自由的主观性、个人自由与他人自由、绝对自由与绝对责任的矛盾使得萨特的人论逻辑的自洽性受到质疑。

The view of freedom is the core content of Sartre’s theory logic. In Sartre’s view, freedom is a necessary condition for man to transcend himself. In other words, only when man is free first can he constantly realize his essence in transcendence. But the freedom that Sartre understood is absolute freedom. Absolute freedom is the internal dilemma of Sartre’s theoretical logic. On the one hand, although freedom is associated with human reality, it is essentially a kind of freedom of will at the transcendental level. On the other hand, there is a conflict between individual freedom and the freedom of others, which means that the realization of individual freedom always has an impact on the realization of the freedom of others, even at the expense of the freedom of others. That is to say, the contradiction between the reality of human existence and the subjectivity of freedom, individual freedom and others, absolute freedom and absolute responsibility makes the self-con- sistency of Sartre’s human logic questioned.