摘要
青年时期马克思既无法像黑格尔本身那般用“理念的自身同一”这样的方法来解决源于“物质利益”的“苦恼的疑问”,也无法像鲍威尔那样直接忽视“物质利益”这一存在是因其“新理性批判主义”的法哲学思想所决定的。在当时,这个以“物质利益”为本质的疑问对于青年时期的马克思而言是一个充满形而上学色彩的法哲学观挑战。
In his youth, Marx could not solve the “vexed question” derived from the “material interest” with the method of “self-identity of idea” like Hegel himself, nor could he directly ignore the existence of “material interest” like Powell because of his “new rational criticism” philosophy of law thought. At that time, the question of “material interests” as the essence was a metaphysical challenge to Marx’s philosophy of law in his youth.
出处
《哲学进展》
2023年第12期2559-2564,共6页
Advances in Philosophy