观念何以实在?——从塞尔“现象学幻觉”之思看胡塞尔观念论对实在论的奠基

Why Can Idealism Contain Realism?—On the Foundation of Husserl’s Idealism on Realism from “The Phenomenological Illusion” Described by Searle

胡塞尔现象学从《逻辑研究》时期的实在论立场转向观念论立场发生在《观念I》时期,伴随着这一转向胡塞尔同时也开始思考历史问题,并促成了发生现象学与历史现象学的诞生。因此,历史问题与从实在论向观念论的转向有着密切的关联。塞尔在《现象学幻觉》中对胡塞尔的批评正是忽略了历史这一关键环节,所以导致他对胡塞尔的理解仅仅停留在静态现象学里。事实上,由于历史因素的介入,发生现象学得以展开,历史现象学得以提出,并通过历史性的实在概念使得胡塞尔的先验观念论可以为实在论奠定更加稳固的基础。

Husserl’s phenomenology shifted from the realism position in the period of “Logical Investigation” to the idealism position in the period of “Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenom-enological Philosophy I”. With this shift, Husserl also began to think about historical issues, which led to the birth of genetic phenomenology and historical phenomenology. Therefore, historical is-sues are closely related to the shift from realism to idealism. Searle’s criticism of Husserl in “Phe-nomenological Illusion” is precisely because he ignored the key link of history, so his understanding of Husserl only stays in static phenomenology. In fact, due to the involvement of historical factors, genetic phenomenology can be developed, historical phenomenology can be proposed, and through the concept of historical reality, Husserl’s transcendental idealism can lay a more solid foundation for realism.