论罗蒂视角下的实用主义真理论

On the Pragmatist Theory of Truth from Rorty’s Perspective

基于符合论、融贯论和实用论等的真理问题探讨贯穿了整个西方哲学史。“有用即真理”使实用主义与真理问题紧密地联系在一起,但“有用或值得相信”的核心原则也暴露出其相对主义、虚无主义和唯心主义的哲学立场,继而导致了逻辑实证主义兴起和实用主义式微。罗蒂新实用主义摒弃了科学主义而实现了对逻辑实证主义的超越,夺回了关于真理定义的话语权。基于对古典实用主义者的评判,并通过对有关相对主义和民族主义批评的辩驳,罗蒂彰显出其具有视域融合性的整体性思想,不再拘泥于一种固定的真理范式,而是提出了一种反本质主义的、反相对主义的新实用主义真理观,并试图转向语言学的解释。罗蒂对真理之元理论地位的否定,实质是在追寻真理开放的共识性和认识的可错性,以调和英美哲学与欧陆哲学的认识论基础。

The question of truth based on conformism, coherence and pragmatism has been explored throughout the history of Western philosophy. Pragmatism has been closely linked to the question of truth by the principle of “usefulness is truth”, but the core principle of “usefulness or worthiness of belief” also reveals its philosophical positions of relativism, nihilism and idealism, which subsequently led to the rise of logical positivism and the decline of pragmatism. Rorty’s neo-pragmatism rejected scientism and transcended logical positivism, reclaiming the right to speak about the definition of truth. Based on a critique of the classical pragmatists, and by refuting criticisms of their relativism and nationalism, Rorty reveals a holistic mindset with a fusion of perspectives, and instead of adhering to a fixed paradigm of truth. He proposes an anti-essentialist, anti-relativist neo-pragmatist conception of truth and attempts to turn to linguistic explanations. Rorty’s rejection of the meta-theoretical status of truth is essentially in pursuit of the open consensus nature of truth and the fallibility of knowledge, in order to reconcile the epistemological foundations of Anglo-American and Continental philosophy.