试论胡塞尔与海德格尔现象学方法之间存在的差异

On the Differences in Phenomenological Methods between Husserl and Heidegger

胡塞尔与海德格尔分别作为现象学理论的主要代表人物,二者在现象学的构建和方法等方面存在着一些差异,在现象学方法上的差异具体如何?本文注重围绕胡塞尔与海德格尔现象学方法之间的差异进行展开,采用从其现象学构建的前提、方法差异等多个方面进行阐述论证的方式,本文得出,胡塞尔的现象学方法是在意向性基础上进行研究,他预设了先验意识主体,并且其要求无前提性的“回到事情本身”,而海德格尔则是建立在生成论的基础之上,是一种生存论的现象学,和胡塞尔存在很大区别,要求此在在生存和诠释的过程中不断显现,是在允许先行领会等前提性存在情况下即先“回到事情本身”再去“面向事情本身”。

Husserl and Heidegger as the main representatives of phenomenological theory, respectively, there are some differences between the two in the construction of phenomenology and method and so on. What are the specific differences in phenomenological methods? This paper focuses on the differences between Husserl’s and Heidegger’s phenomenological methods, and adopts the way of elaboration and argumentation from the premise of their phenomenological construction, methodological differences, etc. This paper comes to the conclusion that Husserl’s phenomenological method is to research on the basis of intentionality, and he presupposes the subject of the a priori consciousness, and he asks for the presuppositional “back to the thing itself”, while Heidegger is based on generativity, an existential phenomenology, which is very different from Husserl’s, and requires that this is constantly revealed in the process of survival and interpretation, and that it is possible to “back to the thing itself” before “face the thing itself”, allowing for the existence of presuppositions such as a priori apprehension.