摘要
法律释明是我国诉讼模式转型前职权主义的有益产物,是经当事人主义检验过的符合民事诉讼理论的内容。2002年《最高人民法院关于民事诉讼证据的若干规定》第35条第1款形成了法律释明和法律观点释明的二元格局,但未厘清二者的生成背景和理论逻辑,造成二者的适用混同。2020年《最高人民法院关于民事诉讼证据的若干规定》第53条第1款意图摈弃法律释明的做法治标不治本,未从根本上解决二元格局的困境。其中,就是否释明当事人变更诉讼请求产生分歧,不利于纠纷的一次性解决。在司法资源紧缺的背景下,应明确法律释明和法律观点释明的相互关系,效率与程序保障不可偏颇。
Legal interpretation is a beneficial product of ex officioism before the transformation of our litigation model, and it is a component of the theory of civil litigation that has been tested by party doctrine and is in line with the theory of civil litigation. Article 35, paragraph 1 of the 2002 “The Supreme People’s Court on the Evidence of Civil Litigation” formed a dualistic pattern of the legal interpretation and interpretation of legal opinions, but did not clarify the background of the two and the theoretical logic of the two, resulting in the application of the two mixed. Article 53, paragraph 1 of the 2020 “The Supreme People’s Court on the Evidence of Civil Litigation” intends to abandon the practice of the legal interpretation to treat the symptoms rather than treating the root cause, and has not fundamentally solved the dilemma of the dual pattern. It has not fundamentally resolved the dilemma of the dual pattern. Among other things, there is disagreement on whether to interpret the parties to change the litigation request, which is not conducive to the one-time settlement of disputes. Against the backdrop of scarce judicial resources, the interrelationship between legal interpretation and interpretation of legal opinions should be clarified, and efficiency and procedural safeguards should not be compromised.
出处
《社会科学前沿》
2024年第7期457-461,共5页
Advances in Social Sciences