管理者过度自信、内部控制与并购溢价——兼论金融行业监管的溢出效应

Managers’ Over-Confidence, Internal Control and M & A Premium—On the Spillover Effect of Financial Industry Supervision

本文选取了2014年至2016年度企业发生的并购交易事件,对当前企业管理者因过度自信而发生并购溢价等情况进行了研究,对两者之间的关系进行了细致分析。在内部控制方面,则以委托代理理论为切入点,研究其调节效应。实证研究发现:管理者的过度自信会令企业在并购决策中更易支付较高溢价;管理者过度自信的公司支付较高溢价,内部控制在其中起着抑制作用。本文的研究结论认为,做好内部控制能够有效地降低并购溢价发生的可能性,减少由于信息不对称带来的极端风险,降低代理冲突发生的次数,并对管理层决策行为具有一定的约束,良好的内部控制能够有效地抑制企业溢价并购的情况。这对于企业估值和相关信息披露的监管机制优化,有着重要的指导意义。同时,分析银行持股对于溢价并购行为是否产生治理效用,也有利于深入认识对银行借贷资金债转股监管所产生的溢出效应及其债转股的制度安排。

Thispaper selects the M&A transaction events from 2014 to 2016,studies thecurrent situation of M&A premium due to overconfidence of enterprisemanagers,and then makes a detailed analysis of the relationship between thetwo variables.In the aspect of internal control,the adjustment effect isstudied by using principal-agent theory as the starting point.The empiricalstudy shows that the overconfidence of managers will make it easier forenterprises to pay a higher premium in M&A decision.The companies with overconfidentmanagers pay a higher premium,in which internal control plays an inhibitoryrole.The conclusion of this paper is that doing well internal control caneffectively reduce the possibility of M&A premium,reduce the extremerisk caused by information asymmetry,reduce the times of agency conflicts,andhave certain constraints on management decision-making behavior.Good internalcontrol can effectively inhibit the situation of enterprise premium M&A,which has a significant guidance for optimizing the regulatory mechanism ofenterprise valuation and related information disclosure.Moreover,analyzingwhether bank shareholding has governance effect on premium M&A is alsohelpful to deeply understand the spillover effect of bank loan fund supervisionand the institutional arrangement of debt-to-equity swap.