摘要
有限合伙是我国PE/VC fund最常见的组织形式之一,多年来我国实践呈现出一种投资者“积极”参与投资决策的特征。本文分析了这种有限合伙人“积极”参与决策行为的原因机理及其负面影响,结合美国、新加坡在限制有限合伙人干预合伙事务方面的国际实践,提出了《合伙企业法》在有限合伙型私募基金监管方面具有信义义务缺失、派生诉讼无法落地、控制规则和安全港条款过于严格的问题,并提出改善建议。
Limited partnership is one of the most common vehicles of PE/VC funds in China. However, the practice in China has shown a high degree of activism among LPs in in-vestment decision-making. This paper analyzes the reasons and mechanisms of this activism and its negative impact, and, in light of the international practice of the United States and Singapore in re-stricting LPs from interfering in partnership affairs, points out that China’s PEL has problems in the regulation of limited partnership private equity funds, such as the lack of fiduciary duty, the inabil-ity to implement derivative litigation, and the overly strict control rules &safe harbor provisions, and gives some suggestions for improvement on this basis.
出处
《争议解决》
2022年第4期1117-1125,共9页
Dispute Settlement
