权利的混合论

A Hybrid Theory of Rights

目前权利概念理论中占据主导地位的是意志论和利益论两个分支,本文认为两种理论均存在缺陷,其中意志论对权利的规范性基础论证不够,利益论则对权利与个人重要性之间的关系的论证失败。为避免这两种理论的缺陷,本文基于张美露的规范性理论,提出一种权利混合论,这种理论一方面能够说明意志在权利概念中的核心地位,进而解释个人重要性;另一方面保留了利益论的合理洞见,权利所承诺的规范性权力到底还是为行动者塑造自身好生活服务,说明权利的规范性基础。

At present, the two branches of the theory of the concept of rights are dominated by the will theory and the interest theory, and this paper argues that both theories are flawed, with the will theory failing to justify the normative basis of rights, and the interest theory failing to justify the relationship between rights and personal importance. To avoid the shortcomings of these two theories, this paper proposes a hybrid theory of rights based on Ruth Chang’s normative theory, which on the one hand can account for the centrality of the will in the concept of rights and thus explain personal importance;on the other hand, it retains the reasonable insight of the interest theory, in which the normative power promised by rights in the end is still in the service of the actors in shaping their own good lives, and accounts for the normative basis of rights.