“重许可,轻监管”现象的经济学解释

The Economic Explanation of the Phenomenon of “Heavy Licensing, Light Supervision”

监管部门“重许可,轻监管”是我国行政体系中历来就有的现象。本文基于不完全信息动态博弈原理,构建了监管部门与企业之间的信号博弈模型进行解释。研究发现,行政许可和监管是实现优劣企业分离的重要手段,“重许可”可以使得在监管很轻的情况下分离均衡形成,这也是这种现象存在的重要原因。鉴于此类现象长期普遍存在,且不利于经济、社会的发展,本文对此提出的策略是持续推进“放管服”改革;建立企业信息披露制度,提高失信企业识别概率;建立社会诚信体系,提高企业的社会责任意识。The phenomenon of “heavy licensing and light supervision” by regulatory authorities departments has always existed in China’s administrative system. This article is based on the principle of incomplete information dynamic game and constructs a signal game model between the regulatory authorities and enterprises for explanation. Research has found that administrative licensing and regulation are important means to achieve the separation of superior and inferior enterprises. “Heavy licensing” can achieve a balanced separation in situations where regulation is light, which is also a significant reason for this phenomenon. Given that such phenomena have been prevalent for a long time and are not conducive to economic and social development, the strategy proposed in this article is to continuously promote the reform of “streamlining administration, delegating powers, and improving services”;establish a corporate information disclosure system to increase the probability of identifying dishonest enterprises;establish a social integrity system and enhance corporate social responsibility awareness.