会计稳健性、超额商誉与并购绩效

Accounting Conservatism, Excess Goodwill and M&A Performance

本文选取我国A股上市公司2007~2020年并购交易事件作为样本,实证检验会计稳健性、超额商誉与并购绩效之间的关系,以期揭示资本市场中业绩承诺和商誉“双高”背景下会计稳健性影响并购绩效的作用机制。研究发现,会计稳健性水平的提高能够有效提升企业并购绩效;超额商誉在会计稳健性与并购绩效之间发挥中介作用,即会计稳健性通过降低超额商誉促进并购绩效提升;在管理层过度自信和企业内部控制质量较差情况下,会计稳健性对并购绩效的正向影响更加显著。研究结论丰富了并购绩效影响因素和会计稳健性经济后果相关文献,对于促进上市公司着力构建会计稳健性治理机制、监管机构优化会计信息披露规则和业绩承诺契约设计、强化并购风险监管具有启示意义。

Using merger and acquisition (M&A) events completed from 2007 to 2020 by A-share listed companies in China as a sample, we empirically test the relationships between accounting conservatism, excess goodwill, and M&A performance, in order to reveal the mechanism by which accounting conservatism affects M&A performance in the context of aggressive performance commitment and high goodwill. We find evidence suggesting that accounting conservatism can effectively improve M&A performance, and excess goodwill plays a mediating role between accounting conservatism and M&A performance, that is, accounting conservatism promotes M&A performance by reducing excess goodwill. Besides, the positive relationship between accounting conservatism and M&A performance is more significant in scenarios of management overconfidence and poorer internal control quality. This paper enriches the literature on the driving factors of M&A performance and the economic consequences of accounting conservatism. It has enlightening implications for listed companies to focus on building accounting conservatism governance mechanisms, and for regulatory agencies to optimize the design of accounting information disclosure rules and performance commitment contracts and strengthen M&A risk supervision.