政府引导基金委托代理问题的演化博弈分析

An Evolutionary Game Analysis on the Principal-Agent Problem of Government Guide Fund

政府引导基金为解决创业投资市场失灵问题而设立,但政府引导基金与创业投资机构的目标分歧和利益冲突使其产生了委托代理问题。政府引导基金应该实施怎样措施平衡“政策性”和“市场化”之间的关系,解决委托代理问题?文章构建政府引导基金和创业投资机构的演化博弈模型,研究两主体的策略选择。通过数值仿真模拟演化博弈策略的均衡点,研究让利和惩罚政策对创业投资机构的影响。结果发现,当创业投资机构获得让利大于投资获得的超额利润与受到惩罚的差额时,二者稳定均衡点才能达到弱监管和投资的理想状态。政府引导基金的激励和惩罚措施达到一定程度时才能对创业投资机构产生约束作用,有效解决委托代理问题,促进企业创新。

The government guiding fund was set up to solve the problem of market failure in venture capital. However, the goal difference and interest conflict between government guiding funds and venture capital institutions lead to the principal-agent problem. What measures should government guiding funds take to balance the relationship between “policy” and “marketization” and solve the principal-agent problem? This paper constructs the evolutionary game model of government guiding fund and venture capital institution, and studies the strategy choice of the two main bodies. The balance point of evolutionary game strategy is simulated, and the influence of profit concession and pun-ishment policy on venture capital institutions is studied. The results show that the ideal state of weak supervision and investment can only be achieved at the stable equilibrium point when the profit yield of venture capital institutions is greater than the difference between the excess profit and the penalty. Only when the incentive and punishment measures of government guiding funds reach a certain level can they exert a restrictive effect on venture capital institutions, effectively solve the principal-agent problem and promote enterprise innovation.