高管薪酬激励与企业税收规避关系研究——基于内部控制质量的调节效应检验

Research on the Relationship between Executive Compensation Incentives and Corporate Tax Avoidance—Regulation Effect Test Based on Internal Control Quality

本文选取我国2016~2020年A股上市公司为研究样本,基于代理理论和寻租理论,利用实证检验来探究高管薪酬激励对企业税收规避的影响,并考察内部控制在二者之间所产生的调节作用。研究发现,高管薪酬激励与企业避税程度呈显著负相关;而当企业的内部控制质量越薄弱时,高管薪酬激励与企业避税程度的负向影响程度将更深。

This paper selects China’s A-share listed companies from 2016 to 2020 as the research sample. Based on agency theory and rent-seeking theory, this paper uses empirical tests to explore the impact of executive compensation incentives on corporate tax avoidance, and examines the moderating effect of internal control between them. The study found that executive compensation incentives are significantly negatively correlated with the degree of corporate tax avoidance;and when the internal control quality of the company is weaker, the negative impact of executive compensation incentives and corporate tax avoidance will be deeper.