销售补贴对企业研发投入和产品定价的影响研究

Research on the Influence of Sales Subsidy on Enterprise R&D Investment and Product Pricing

本文通过构建序贯博弈模型,讨论了疫情背景下政府推出销售补贴政策对于企业的研发投入和产品定价策略的影响。研究发现,自身科研经费的投入能使企业在市场竞争中获得价格优势和提升企业的市场份额,而对手企业科研经费的投入会使得企业被迫降低市场价格和丧失市场份额。当所有企业同时进行科研经费投入时,企业仍可以通过自身的科研经费在一定程度上获得价格优势和提升市场份额,因此,无论对手企业是否进行科研经费的投入,企业都应当加大科研经费的投入力度。无论是定量还是按比例销售补贴,都会削减企业自主研发投入的积极性。因此,本文结论意味着定量和按比例销售补贴都降低了企业的研发投入,企业能在市场竞争的条件下自主地加大自身的研发投入力度。

By constructing a sequential game model, this paper discusses the impact of sales subsidy policies launched by governments on enterprises’ R&D investment and product pricing strategies under the background of the epidemic. The study found that the investment of own scientific research funds can enable enterprises to gain price advantages in market competition and increase their market share, while the investment of rival enterprises’ scientific research funds will force enterprises to lower market prices and lose market shares. When all enterprises invest in scientific research funds at the same time, enterprises can still obtain price advantages and increase market share to a certain extent through their own scientific research funds. Therefore, regardless of whether rival companies invest in scientific research funds, enterprises should increase their research funds. Whether it is quantitative or proportional sales subsidies, it will reduce the enthusiasm of enterprises to invest in independent research and development. Therefore, the conclusion of this paper means that both quantitative and proportional sales subsidies reduce the R&D investment of enterprises, and enterprises can independently increase their own R&D investment under the conditions of market competition.