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基于CVaR的智能电网供应链价格补贴及返利契约协调研究

CVAR-Based Smart Grid Supply Chain Price Subsidy and Rebate Contract Coordination Research
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摘要 以由供电商与电网运营商之间构成的二级智能电网供应链为研究对象,且二者相互独立。本文从风险中性、风险规避型电网运营商与风险中性供电商之间的利益关系去研究电网供应链的协调问题,并建立价格补贴及返利契约模型,以此分析智能电网供应链中各成员是否能通过契约达到利益相对平衡关系,同时实现整体电网供应链协调。采用条件风险价值(CVaR)研究风险规避型电网运营商与供电商之间的契约关系,及实现供应链协调。数值分析中,验证了价格补贴及返利契约可以通过协调补贴与返利参数实现收益的合理分配,并体现了该契约下电网供应链实现协调的可行性。 The secondary smart grid supply chain composed of power suppliers and grid operators is studied as the research object, and the two are independent of each other. In this paper, the coordination problem of the power grid supply chain is studied from the perspective of the interest relationship between the risk-neutral and risk-averse power grid operators and the risk-neutral power supply provider, and the price subsidy and rebate contract model are established to analyze whether the members of the smart grid supply chain can achieve a relatively balanced relationship of interests through the contract, and at the same time realize the coordination of the overall power grid supply chain. Conditional Value at Risk (CVaR) is used to study the contractual relationship between risk-averse grid operators and power suppliers, and to achieve supply chain coordination. In the numerical analysis, it is verified that the price subsidy and rebate contract can achieve a reasonable distribution of benefits by coordinating subsidies and rebate parameters, and the feasibility of coordinating the power grid supply chain under the contract is reflected.
作者 赵峰 党亚峥
出处 《建模与仿真》 2022年第5期1340-1351,共12页 Modeling and Simulation
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