基于电力供应链下的可再生能源投资策略研究

Research on Investment Strategy of Power Supply Chain Based on Carbon Quota and Trading Mechanism

基于电力供应链下研究可再生能源投资决策问题。在碳限额与交易机制背景下,构建了由发电商作为领导者与售电商作为追随者的电网供应链博弈模型,分别考虑了发电商、售电商以及两者均等投资可再生能源下的电价、发电量的决策问题。当发电商投资可再生能源时,售电商优先售卖可再生能源电力;当售电商投资可再生能源时,售电商仍优先售卖可再生能源电力,此时发电商电力市场被瓜分;当发电商与售电商均等投资可再生能源时,售电商优先售卖自身生产的可再生能源电力。通过比较三种情形的均衡结果,主要研究结果如下:1) 发电商和售电商均等投资可再生能源时,进一步拉低电价,增加电力需求量,并减少了传统发电量;2) 随着再生能源投资成本系数的增加,会导致可再生能源电量和需求电量的降低。3) 可再生能源偏好系数的增加会导致售电商的利润增加,但发电商利润降低。

Under the background of carbon quota and trading mechanism, this paper constructs a power grid supply chain game model with power producers as leaders and power sellers as followers, and con-siders three situations: power producers investing in renewable energy, power sellers investing in renewable energy and equal investment in renewable energy. On this basis, the decision-making of electricity price and renewable energy is studied. By comparing the equilibrium results of the three cases, the main research results are as follows: 1) Compared with the situation of power producers investing in renewable energy, there will be more investment, more power demand and lower price when power sellers invest in renewable energy. At the same time, when power producers and pow-er sellers invest in renewable energy equally, they will further lower the electricity price and in-crease the power demand, And reduce the traditional power generation;2) With the increase of renewable energy investment cost coefficient, it will lead to the reduction of renewable energy power and demand power, the rise of wholesale price and retail price and the decline of profit in-come of e-sellers;3) The preference coefficient of renewable energy will lead to an increase in the profits of electricity sellers, but a decrease in the profits of power producers.