考虑用户异质性和瓶颈处停车换乘的交通定价模型研究

The Pricing Model of Parking and Transit Fare Considering Park-and-Ride Facilities and User Heterogeneity

本文基于停车换乘和全程自驾两种出行模式,考虑两类出行时间价值和偏好不同的用户,以瓶颈模型为基础搭建双层规划模型,探究了停车场运营商和公交公司在市场竞争和政府干预两种情况下的交通定价方案。其中,换乘停车场和中心停车场分别由公交公司和私人运营商所有。上层管理者的目标函数是最大化利益主体的净利润;下层跟随者根据上层设定的交通价格,选择最小化个人出行成本的交通出行方案。最后通过算例验证了模型的有效性,并发现随着时间价值较高出行者对应出行比例的增大,完全市场竞争和政府管控下的系统总成本之间的差距会逐步增大。

This paper extends the bottleneck model and develops a bi-level programming model to study the traffic charge problem between two companies, one of which operates buses and park-and-ride (P&R) parking lots simultaneously, while the other of which owns central parking lots. Therefore, commuters can get their destination by either auto or P&R mode. The proposed model analyzes two game scenarios: perfect competition and market regulation and considers heterogeneous users who are distinguished by their valuation of travel time. Specifically, in the upper level, the objective of operators is to maximize their own net profit;in the lower level, the followers would choose the optimal travel plans given the traffic charge rules. Finally, numerical examples are provided to illustrate the effectiveness of the developed models;furthermore, the result shows that when the proportion of commuters with higher value of time (VOT) is increasing, the gap of total social costs between two game scenarios becomes larger.