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公司收购中企业社会责任问题

On the Issues of CSR in Company Takeover
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摘要 对公司收购施以社会责任之要求,事实上构成了对公司收购的一种阻碍,这与长久以来立法将公司收购市场作为公司治理的重要机制之一,促进公司收购市场发展,发挥其增进资本流动和管理层经营效率等作用的宗旨却有所背离。目前各国纷纷效仿的英美公司收购立法,对于公司收购中社会责任的价值判断,体现于对不同利益冲突的具体权衡之中,其核心是在公司和股东利益与利益相关者利益之间寻求平衡点。我国近年来有关公司立法一方面强化了公司和股东利益保护,另一方面,也引入了公司社会责任的理念。我国对公司目标的定位与美国相同,但又采纳了英国股东单独决定收购要约的模式,实际免除了管理层对利益相关者的信托义务。实践中对于国有股权、产业发展、经济安全和“民族品牌”的保护尤为重视,为利益相关者采取收购防御措施的很少,通过非法律途径的居多,内部人控制严重问题与国有资产管理体制的缺陷结合起来,实际演变成目标公司董事会与收购者之争。建议增加管理层的话语权、强化管理层的信托责任并借鉴西方成熟的司法规则,减少公司收购中不规范的利益诉求方式。 Considering CSR is a kind of block in company takeover, CSR as a common tool of takeover defense in practice deviates from the legal aim to promote company takeover market and takes advantage of its function in company governance. Nowadays, company takeover law in USA and UK are fol-lowed by most countries to help finding the value of CSR and balancing different interests in judicial judgment. In recent years, China’s company legislation drew into CSR while intensifying the protection of company and shareholders, and learned both from USA and UK in company takeover aim and decision model, which in fact excused the management from duties for stakeholders. In China’s practice, it was paid more attention in protecting state owned shares, industry development, economic safe and national brands, and less in takeover defense for stakeholders through legal ways. Inner control and problems in system of state owned assets, triggered the fighting between the board of directors in target company and the acquirer. It is proposed to increase the power of management in company takeover and consolidate their duties for stakeholder to decrease the nonstandard claims in company takeovers.
作者 王红一
机构地区 中山大学法学院
出处 《法学(汉斯)》 2014年第4期25-33,共9页 Open Journal of Legal Science
基金 国家社会科学基金一般项目“金融机构社会责任研究”(批准号:09BFX049)阶段成果.
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