威慑理论与事前监管在反垄断规制中的应用

The Application of Deterrence Theory and Prior Supervision in Anti-Monopoly Regulation

平台企业与数字经济在当下社会市场环境中的重要性逐年增强,随着欧盟《数字市场法》的出台,事前监管工具开始以法律明确规定的形式呈现在规制视野中。事前监管工具具有专属和前置特性,其与法律威慑理论的结合共同反映了提升严厉程度和惩罚概率在反垄断领域中的未来立法导向,两者的连接有望在一定程度上对市场中大型平台企业产生有效威慑,促使其能发挥对公众日常经济生活正向影响。在此趋势下我国反垄断法也在原有的框架基础上增强了法规的严厉性和确定性,突出威慑所带来的源头性限制作用,综合事前和事后的双重管制效果,为反垄断规制的完善协同发力。

The importance of platform enterprises and the digital economy in the current social market environment has increased year by year. With the promulgation of the European Union’s Digital Market Law, pre-regulatory tools have begun to appear in the regulatory vision in the form clearly stipulated by law. The pre-supervision tool has exclusive and pre-positional characteristics. Its combination with the theory of legal deterrence reflects the future legislative orientation of improving severity and punishment probability in the anti-monopoly field. The connection between the two is expected to effectively deter large platform enterprises in the market to a certain extent, so that they can play a positive role in the daily life of the public. Under this trend, China’s anti-monopoly law also enhances the severity and certainty of laws and regulations on the basis of the original framework, highlights the original restriction effect brought by deterrence, and synthesizes the double control effect before and after the event, so as to improve the anti-monopoly regulation.