摘要
随着人工智能产品种类的增多、应用范围的扩大,各类人工智能侵权案件层出不穷,人工智能侵权归责问题亟待解决。人工智能的拟人性特征导致现阶段人工智能法律地位颇具争议,产生了肯定说、否定说和折中说三种学说,折中说破坏了现行民法的基本理念,而人工智能技术发展初期,贸然赋予人工智能主体地位不会产生实际效应,明确人工智能是权利义务的客体,才是技术发展和权利保护的要求;其次,适用产品责任解决人工智能侵权问题具有合理性,人工智能产品的生产者、设计者应当承担无过错责任;但产品责任无法合理分配人工智能产品使用人的责任以及特殊类型的侵权案件责任,对此笔者认为在现阶段人工智能的使用人应承担过错责任,但在无人驾驶等特殊领域使用人应承担无过错责任。在人工智能领域特殊类型侵权的归责问题,则要引入公平责任,以此来保护受害者的权益。
With the increase of the number of artificial intelligence products and the expansion of the scope of application, various artificial intelligence infringement cases have emerged one after another, and the problem of artificial intelligence infringement attribution needs to be solved urgently. The anthropomorphic characteristics of artificial intelligence have led to the controversial legal status of artificial intelligence at this stage, resulting in three theories of affirmation, negation and compromise theory. The compromise theory destroys the basic concepts of the current civil law. In the early stage of the development of artificial intelligence technology, rashly giving artificial intelligence the subject status will not produce practical effects, and it is clear that artificial Intelligence is the object of rights and obligations, and is the requirement of technology development and rights protection. Secondly, it is reasonable to apply product responsibility to solve the problem of artificial intelligence infringement, and the producers and designers of artificial intelligence products should bear no fault responsibility. However, product responsibility cannot reasonably allocate the responsibility of users of artificial intelligence products and For the liability of special types of infringement cases, the author believes that at this stage, the user of artificial intelligence should bear the responsibility for fault, but the user in special fields such as unmanned driving should bear the responsibility for no fault. For the attribution of special types of infringement in the field of artificial intelligence, fair liability should be introduced to protect the rights and interests of victims.
出处
《法学(汉斯)》
2024年第3期1501-1508,共8页
Open Journal of Legal Science