供需不确定下供应商和零售商均是风险厌恶的供应链协调

The Coordination of Supply Chain with a Risk Aversion Supplier and a Risk Aversion Retailer under Supply and Demand Uncertainties

本文讨论供应和需求不确定的供应链协调问题,其中供应商和零售商都是风险厌恶的,即他们对损失是厌恶的。应用心理账户理论及罚函数思想,本文构建了一个新的效用函数,并利用其构建供应链决策模型。理论分析表明:批发价契约不能协调供应链,但是回购–成本损失分担联合契约可以实现供应链协调。最后用数值例子验证了理论结果,并发现在供应链协调时,随着成本分担系数增加,损失分担系数和单位回购价也增加,零售商期望效用和期望利润逐步减少,而供应商的期望效用和期望利润则逐步增加。供应链成员的风险厌恶程度影响契约参数取值。

In this article, the coordination of supply chain under supply and demand uncertainties is dis-cussed, in which the supply and retailer are both risk averse and their risk is the loss caused by uncertain supply and demand. To measure the magnitude of risk, a new utility function was con-structed based on the theory of mental account and penalty function, and was used to analyze the coordination of supply chain. Theoretical analysis shows that the wholesale price contract cannot coordinate the supply chain, but the buyback-cost loss sharing joint contract can achieve supply chain coordination. Finally, the theoretical results are verified by numerical examples, and it is found that under the condition of supply chain coordination, with the increase of cost-sharing coefficient, loss-sharing coefficient and unit repurchase price also increase, the ex-pected utility and expected profit of retailers gradually decrease, while the expected utility and expected profit of suppliers gradually increase. The degree of risk aversion of supply chain members affects the value of contract parameters.