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CEO的学术经历能否抑制大股东给掏空行为?

Can CEO’s Academic Experience Inhibit the Tunneling Behavior of Major Shareholders?
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摘要 本文以2008~2019年我国A股上市公司为初始研究样本,实证检验CEO学术经历是否会抑制控股大股东的掏空行为,研究发现,具有学术经历的CEO可以有效抑制控股大股东的掏空行为,进一步分析大股东持股比例显著削弱了CEO的学术经历与控股大股东掏空行为间的关系,机构持股比例显著强化了CEO的学术经历与控股大股东掏空行为之间的关系。 This paper takes China’s A-share listed companies from 2008 to 2019 as the initial research sample, and empirically tests whether CEO academic experience can inhibit tunneling behavior of controlling large shareholders. The study finds that CEOs with academic experience can effectively inhibit tunneling behavior of controlling large shareholders, and further analyzes that the shareholding ratio of large shareholders significantly weakens the relationship between CEO academic experience and tunneling behavior of controlling large shareholders. The institutional shareholding ratio has significantly strengthened the relationship between CEO’s academic experience and tunneling behavior of controlling shareholders.
作者 陈叶 许为宾
出处 《运筹与模糊学》 2023年第1期45-57,共13页 Operations Research and Fuzziology
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