摘要
考虑由单一供应商和单一零售商组成的双渠道供应链,为研究不同预售策略下供应商和零售商的定价与服务水平决策,划分了三种预售策略:供应商直销预售、零售商预售、合作预售。针对每种预售策略,构建以利润最大化为目标的Stackelberg博弈模型,对产品的销售价格、服务水平等均衡策略进行比较。结果表明:1) 预售价格:在利润分成比例λ较低时,合作预售 < 供应商预售 < 零售商预售;当分成比例较高时,供应商预售 < 零售商预售 < 合作预售。随着消费者服务敏感度增大,销售价格应逐渐提高。2) 服务水平:当λ较低时,零售商预售策略服务水平最高;当λ较高时,供应商预售 < 零售商预售 < 合作预售。当服务成本系数增加时,预售和现售阶段都应设置更低的销售价格。3) 零售商预售策略和合作预售策略下供应商可以获得更高的利润。当利润分成比例适中时,零售商和供应商在合作预售策略下均能获得较高的利润。
Considering a dual-channel supply chain composed of a single supplier and a single retailer, in order to study the pricing and service level decisions of suppliers and retailers under different advance selling strategies, three advance selling strategies are divided: supplier direct advance selling, retailer advance selling, and cooperative advance selling. For each advance selling strategy, a Stackelberg game model with profit maximization as the goal is constructed to compare the equilibrium strategies such as product sales price and service level. The results show that: 1) advance selling price: when the profit sharing ratio λ is low, cooperative advance selling < sup-plier advance selling < retailer pre-sale;when the share ratio is high, supplier advance selling < retailer advance selling < cooperative advance selling. With the increase of consumer service sensitivity, the sales price should be gradually increased. 2) Service level: when λ is low, the service level of the retailer’s advance selling strategy is the highest;when λ is high, supplier advance selling < retailer advance selling < cooperative advance selling. When the service cost co-efficient increases, the advance selling and on-sale stages should set lower sales prices. 3) Suppliers can obtain higher profits under retailer’s advance selling strategy and cooperative ad-vance selling strategy. When the profit sharing ratio is moderate, both retailers and suppliers can obtain higher profits under the cooperative advance selling strategy.
出处
《运筹与模糊学》
2023年第6期7174-7186,共13页
Operations Research and Fuzziology