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北海湿地生态产品价值实现的委托代理机制研究

Research on the Principal-Agent Mechanism for Value Realization of Beihai Wetland Ecological Products
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摘要 在新质生产力发展理念下,将我国辽阔大地山川作为优质的自然资源进行市场化配置,打破我国生态资源丰富地区贫困和环境日益退化的状况,了解自然资源的经营权和使用权主体,并在一个合理的范围内利用好自然资源,才能刺激当地的经济发展。本文选择云南省腾冲北海湿地为研究对象,对自然资源的分配进行委托代理过程中目标不一致引起的自然资源利润分配不合理的情况进行研究,结果表明:第一,针对自然资源的管理,中央与地方政府事权不统一,利益目标不一致,出现政策执行偏差的情况,运用委托代理方案可妥善解决。第二,国家对地方政府要求完成的经济发展任务和环境要求存在矛盾,同时,在全民所有自然资源委托代理实施过程中,应该对自然资源的委托代理模式进行创新,例如进行特许经营模式。 Under the concept of developing new quality productive forces, market-oriented allocation of China’s vast mountains and rivers as high-quality natural resources is necessary to break the poverty and environmental degradation situation in ecologically rich areas in China, understanding the main body of the right to operate and use natural resources, and utilising natural resources within a reasonable range, in order to stimulate the development of the local economy. This paper chooses the Tengchong Beihai Wetland in Yunnan Province as the research object, and studies the unreasonable distribution of natural resources profit caused by the inconsistency of objectives in the process of natural resources allocation by proxy, and the results show that: firstly, for the management of natural resources, there is inconsistency between the central and local governments in terms of authority, inconsistency in the objectives of interests, and the occurrence of deviation in the implementation of policies, and the use of proxy programmes can be solved appropriately. Secondly, there is a contradiction between the economic development tasks and the environmental requirements that the State requires of local governments, and at the same time, in the process of implementing the entrustment agency for natural resources owned by the whole population, the entrustment agency model of natural resources should be innovated, for example, by carrying out a franchise model.
作者 金璐
出处 《可持续发展》 2024年第4期984-991,共8页 Sustainable Development
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