标准模型下一种基于身份的面向群组签密方案的安全性分析

Cryptanalysis of an Identity-Based Group-Oriented Signcryption Scheme in the Standard Model

面向群组的签密方法在现今的网络通信中是一种很有效的数据安全保护手段,它可以在对信息进行个人数字签名的同时对数据进行加密。本文针对Zhang和Xu等人提出的一种基于身份的面向群组签密方案[1]进行了安全分析,指出该方案存在严重的安全漏洞,并在标准模型下证明该方案无法抵抗择密文攻击以及选择消息攻击的攻击。

Group-oriented signcryption is a very useful primitive in the network communication field, which simultaneously provides the functionalities of encryption and signature. Recently, Zhang, Xu, et al. [1] proposed an identity-based group-oriented signcryption scheme and claimed that their scheme is provably secure in a strengthened security model. Unfortunately, by giving concrete attacks, we indicate that this signcryption scheme is not secure under either choose ciphertext attack or choose message attack, in this strengthened security model.