摘要
近年来,高管薪酬激励制度的研究一直受到学者们的广泛关注。本文从高管薪酬激励制度的激励水平和激励差距两方面,研究了竞争战略是否会对高管薪酬激励产生影响。接着,又进一步探讨了在不同竞争战略下,高管薪酬激励水平和激励差距的业绩敏感性差异。本文以2016~2018年制造业上市公司为研究对象,得出以下结论:1) 不同竞争战略下的高管薪酬激励制度存在着明显差异,竞争战略对高管薪酬的激励水平和激励差距均存在显著影响。2) 实施差异化竞争战略的公司其高管薪酬激励水平和激励差距的业绩敏感性与实施低成本竞争战略的公司相比存在差异,其中前者明显高于后者。本文为高管薪酬与公司业绩两者间的研究提供了新视角,有助于公司结合自身的竞争战略制定出更加合理的高管业绩敏感性薪酬激励制度,提升高管薪酬激励制度的效用。
The executive compensation incentive system has been widely concerned by scholars. This paper which is from the perspective of the incentive level and the incentive gap of the executive compensation incentive system, explores whether “competitive strategy” affect executive compensation incentive. What’s more, it further discusses the differences in performance sensitivity of executive compensation incentive levels and incentive gaps under different competitive strategies. This article takes the listed manufacturing companies in 2016~2018 as the research object and draws the following conclusions: 1) There are significant differences in executive compensation incentive systems under different competitive strategies. Competitive strategies have significant effects on the incentive level and incentive gap of executive compensation. 2) Compared with companies implementing low-cost competitive strategies, the performance sensitivity of executive compensation incentive levels and incentive gaps of companies implementing differentiated competitive strategies are significantly different from those implementing low-cost competitive strategies. The former is significantly higher than the latter. The research in this paper provides a new perspective for the study of executive compensation incentive system. What’s more, it helps companies to formulate more reasonable executive performance-sensitive compensation incentive systems based on their own competitive strategies and improve the effectiveness of the executive compensation incentive system as well.
出处
《世界经济探索》
2022年第4期306-318,共13页
World Economic Research
