摘要
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems are attractive targets for attackers, as they offer an avenue to attack critical infrastructure (CI) systems controlled by SCADA systems. Ultimately, an attack on any system exploits some undesired (malicious or accidental) functionality in the components of the system. Unfortunately, it is far from practical to eliminate undesired functionality in every component of a system. The contribution of this paper is a novel architecture for securing SCADA systems that guarantee that “any malicious modification of the deployment configuration or the design configuration of the SCADA system will be detected”—even if undesired functionality may exist in SCADA system components.
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems are attractive targets for attackers, as they offer an avenue to attack critical infrastructure (CI) systems controlled by SCADA systems. Ultimately, an attack on any system exploits some undesired (malicious or accidental) functionality in the components of the system. Unfortunately, it is far from practical to eliminate undesired functionality in every component of a system. The contribution of this paper is a novel architecture for securing SCADA systems that guarantee that “any malicious modification of the deployment configuration or the design configuration of the SCADA system will be detected”—even if undesired functionality may exist in SCADA system components.
