摘要
Our dependability on software in every aspect of our lives has exceeded the level that was expected in the past. We have now reached a point where we are currently stuck with technology, and it made life much easier than before. The rapid increase of technology adoption in the different aspects of life has made technology affordable and has led to an even stronger adoption in the society. As technology advances, almost every kind of technology is now connected to the network like infrastructure, automobiles, airplanes, chemical factories, power stations, and many other systems that are business and mission critical. Because of our high dependency on technology in most, if not all, aspects of life, a system failure is considered to be very critical and might result in harming the surrounding environment or put human life at risk. We apply our conceptual framework to integration between security and safety by creating a SaS (Safety and Security) domain model. Furthermore, it demonstrates that it is possible to use goal-oriented KAOS (Knowledge Acquisition in automated Specification) language in threat and hazard analysis to cover both safety and security domains making their outputs, or artifacts, well-structured and comprehensive, which results in dependability due to the comprehensiveness of the analysis. The conceptual framework can thereby act as an interface for active interactions in risk and hazard management in terms of universal coverage, finding solutions for differences and contradictions which can be overcome by integrating the safety and security domains and using a unified system analysis technique (KAOS) that will result in analysis centrality. For validation we chose the Systems-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes (STAMP) approach and its modelling language, namely System-Theoretic Process Analysis for safety (STPA), on the safety side and System-Theoretic Process Analysis for Security (STPA-sec) on the security side in order to be the base of the experiment in comparison to what was done in SaS. The concepts of SaS domain model were applied on STAMP approach using the same example @RemoteSurgery.
Our dependability on software in every aspect of our lives has exceeded the level that was expected in the past. We have now reached a point where we are currently stuck with technology, and it made life much easier than before. The rapid increase of technology adoption in the different aspects of life has made technology affordable and has led to an even stronger adoption in the society. As technology advances, almost every kind of technology is now connected to the network like infrastructure, automobiles, airplanes, chemical factories, power stations, and many other systems that are business and mission critical. Because of our high dependency on technology in most, if not all, aspects of life, a system failure is considered to be very critical and might result in harming the surrounding environment or put human life at risk. We apply our conceptual framework to integration between security and safety by creating a SaS (Safety and Security) domain model. Furthermore, it demonstrates that it is possible to use goal-oriented KAOS (Knowledge Acquisition in automated Specification) language in threat and hazard analysis to cover both safety and security domains making their outputs, or artifacts, well-structured and comprehensive, which results in dependability due to the comprehensiveness of the analysis. The conceptual framework can thereby act as an interface for active interactions in risk and hazard management in terms of universal coverage, finding solutions for differences and contradictions which can be overcome by integrating the safety and security domains and using a unified system analysis technique (KAOS) that will result in analysis centrality. For validation we chose the Systems-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes (STAMP) approach and its modelling language, namely System-Theoretic Process Analysis for safety (STPA), on the safety side and System-Theoretic Process Analysis for Security (STPA-sec) on the security side in order to be the base of the experiment in comparison to what was done in SaS. The concepts of SaS domain model were applied on STAMP approach using the same example @RemoteSurgery.
