核心代理问题对盈余管理之影响

An Empirical Study of Core Agency Problem on Earnings Management

本文从核心代理问题的角度，被视台湾上市（柜）公司股权结构，董事会特性对盈余管理之关联性，同时探讨机构投资人及外部董事等监督机制之效果。实证结果发现：（1）管理者持股与盈余管理呈负相关，支持利益收敛假说。（2）控制权与现金流量请求权偏离程度愈大，盈余管理程度愈大，显示核心代理问题确会使盈余管理行为增加。（3）管理者持股比率与盈余管理存有非线性关系，管理者持股比率在6.25 %以下与盈余管理呈负向显着关系，管理者持股比率介於6.25 %-25 %与盈余管理呈正向显着关系。（4）控制权与现金流量请求权偏离程度，对盈余管理的影响仅出现在有调升盈余动机之样本，显示权益代理问题或核心代理问题与盈余管理的关系，在企业面临亏损或避免盈余为负时会较明显，即管理者或控制股东，会为了达到盈余门槛使盈余平滑化，使其有强烈动机进行盈余管理。（5）盈余管理会随董监事股权质押及董事长兼任总经理更加明显，但能藉由董监持股、机构投资人持股及外部董事比率提高而获得改善。

The purpose of this paper is to examine the effect of ownership structure and board characteristics on earnings management from the perspective of core agency problem. In addition, we also investigate the monitoring effect of the institutional investors, and the outside directors. The empirical results indicate as follows. First, managerial ownership is negatively related to earnings management and hence supports convergence of interest hypothesis. Second, when managers of the companies have more control rights than cash flow right, which results in a core agency problem, managers are more likely to manage earnings. Third, the managerial ownership has an U-shape relationship with earnings management. Fourth, the relationship between core agency problem and earnings management becomes evident, when managers use earnings management to avoid earnings decreases or losses. It means that managers have more earnings management behavior before reached the goal of earnings (thresholds). Finally, the pledge ratio of shares of directors and the chief executive officer (CEO) duality have positive relationship with earning management, but the shares of directors, institutional ownership and the number of the outside directors have negative relationship with earning management.